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LETTER
Quantum Optimal Multiple Assignment Scheme for Realizing
General Access Structure of Secret Sharing
Ryutaroh MATSUMOTO†, Senior Member
SUMMARY The multiple assignment scheme is to assign one or more
shares to single participant so that any kind of access structure can be real-
ized by classical secret sharing schemes. We propose its quantum version
including ramp secret sharing schemes. Then we propose an integer opti-
mization approach to minimize the average share size.
key words: quantum secret sharing, multiple assignment scheme, access
structure
1. Introduction
Secret sharing (SS) [1] is a cryptographic scheme to encode
a secret to multiple shares being distributed to participants,
so that only qualified sets of participants can reconstruct the
original secret from their shares. Traditionally both secret
and shares were classical information (bits). Several au-
thors, e.g. [2]–[4] extended the traditional SS to quantum
one so that a quantum secret can be encoded to quantum
shares.
A set of participants is called forbidden if the set has
absolutely no information about the secret. A secret sharing
scheme is called perfect [5] if every set of participants is
always qualified or forbidden. If a set is neither qualified
or forbidden in a secret sharing scheme, the scheme is said
to be ramp or non-perfect. A merit of the ramp schemes
is to reduce share size (the number of bits or qubits) while
keeping the secret size [6]–[8].
Traditionally, the access structure called the threshold
structure has been the most focused one, e.g. [1], [2], [7],
where a set of participants is qualified if and only if the num-
ber of participants is ≥ t. A scheme with a threshold struc-
ture is called a threshold scheme. A well-known method to
realize an arbitrary access structure is the multiple assign-
ment scheme proposed by Shamir [1] and named by Ito et
al. [9]. On the other hand, Smith [4] showed how to real-
ize an arbitrary access structure in quantum perfect secret
sharing schemes, while nobody has shown a construction of
quantum ramp schemes with arbitrary access structures.
The multiple assignment scheme assigns multiple
shares of a threshold scheme to single participants, and a
single share can be assigned to multiple participants. It is not
straight forward to adapt the multiple assignment scheme, as
the no-cloning theorem [10] prevents us from making mul-
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tiple copies of a single quantum share. The first purpose of
this paper is to propose a quantum version of the multiple
assignment scheme.
For a given size of secret, it is important to reduce the
size of shares. A demerit of multiple assignment scheme in
[9] was lack of consideration of share size. Later, Iwamoto
et al. [11] proposed an integer optimization approach to min-
imize the worst-case or the average share size of multiple
assignment scheme. The second purpose of this paper is to
adapt Iwamoto et al.’s integer optimization problem to our
proposed quantum setting.
2. Review of Previous Research Results
By a classical secret sharing scheme, we mean that its secret
and its shares are classical information, while by a quantum
secret sharing scheme, its secret and its shares are quantum
information. For a set T , 2T denotes its power set {T0 | T0 is
a subset of T }, and we have |2T | = 2|T |.
Firstly, we review the multiple assignment scheme
named by Ito et al. [9] and originally proposed by Shamir
[1]. The multiple assignment scheme construct a classical
secret sharing scheme with n participants from that with m
participants. It is a mapΦ from {1, . . . , n} to 2{1,...,m}. Let W1,
. . . , Wm be the shares of the original secret sharing scheme.
The new secret sharing scheme constructed by Φ distributes
{W j | j ∈ Φ(i)} to the i-th participants. For example, sup-
pose that m = 3, n = 2, Φ(1) = {1, 2}, and Φ(2) = {2, 3}.
Then, in the new constructed secret sharing scheme, the first
participant receives {W1, W2} as his/her share, and the sec-
ond one receives {W2, W3} as his/her share. This method
works fine with the classical information. But its straight-
forward extension to the quantum information is impossi-
ble, because the quantum no-cloning theorem [10] prevents
us from distributing the same W2 to both first and second
participants. To avoid this impossibility, we will focus the
relation between two shares {W1, W2} and {W2, W3}, which
can be expressed by linear codes, and will propose to trans-
fer the relation to the quantum setting.
A classical secret sharing is said to be linear if any lin-
ear combination of shares expresses the corresponding lin-
ear combination of secrets [12]. Let Fq be a finite field with
q elements. It was shown that any linear classical secret
sharing scheme can be expressed [13, Proposition 1] by a
pair of linear codes C2 ⊂ C1 ⊂ Fnq as follows, provided that
the linearity is considered over Fq.
For a classical secret sharing scheme corresponding to
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C2 ⊂ C1, the set of secrets is the factor space
C1/C2 = {~a + C2 | ~a ∈ C1}.
Therefore a secret S ∈ C1/C2 is a subset of C1. For a given
secret S ∈ C1/C2, a vector X = (X1, . . . , Xn) is chosen
uniformly randomly from S . A subset of {X1, . . . , Xn} is
distributed to each participant as his/her share. For practical
use of secret sharing schemes, it is indispensable to have a
criterion by which one can identify qualified or forbidden
sets of shares. Let I ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, and a set of participants
collectively have {Xi | i ∈ I} as their shares. Let PI be
the projection map sending (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Fnq to (xi)i∈I , and
PI(C1) = {PI(~x) | ~x ∈ C1}. It was shown in [14] that the set
of shares expressed by I is qualified iff
dim PI(C1) − dim PI(C2) = dim C1 − dim C2, (1)
and is forbidden iff
dim PI(C1) − dim PI(C2) = 0. (2)
It is known that most of quantum ramp secret sharing
schemes can also be described by a pair of linear codes C2 ⊂
C1 ⊂ Fnq as follows [15]. Let L = dim C1 − dim C2, then
the dimension of (pure state) quantum secret is qL and its
orthonormal basis can be chosen as {|~s〉 | ~s ∈ FLq }. The linear
space of all the possible quantum shares is qn-dimensional,
and its orthonormal basis can be chosen as {|~x〉 | ~x ∈ Fnq}.
We fix an Fq-linear map f from FLq to the factor linear space
C1/C2, and a quantum secret |~s〉 is encoded to
1√
qL
∑
~x∈ f (~s)
|~x〉, (3)
which is the same as the encoding procedure of the CSS
quantum error-correcting codes [16], [17]. Equation (3) can
be regarded as a quantum state of n particles having dimen-
sion q. In this paper qudit refers to a quantum object that
is represented by q-dimensional complex linear space. Each
participant receives a non-overlapping subset of the n parti-
cles of Eq. (3) as his/her quantum share.
As well as the classical case, we need a criterion to tell
if a set of shares is qualified or forbidden. Recall that a share
set is qualified if and only if its complement is forbidden
[2], [7] when the quantum secret sharing scheme is a pure-
state scheme, which encode a pure-state secret to a pure-
state shares [2]. It was also shown [2] that it is sufficient
to consider pure-state schemes. Let I ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, and a
set of participants collectively have I as their shares, that is,
the set of participants has the i-th quantum particle among n
particles, each of which has dimension q, if and only if i ∈ I.
The share set I is qualified if and only if I is qualified and I is
forbidden in the classical secret sharing scheme constructed
from C1 ⊃ C2, where I = {1, . . . , n}. In other words, I is
qualified if and only if both Eq. (2) with I substituted by I
and Eq. (1) hold.
3. Proposed Method to Construct a Quantum Ramp
Secret Sharing Scheme with a General Access Struc-
ture
Suppose that the number of participants is n. Let q be a
prime power as before, and the dimension of quantum se-
cret is assumed to be qL for a positive integer L. Let AQ ⊂
2{1,...,n} be the family of qualified sets given as the require-
ment for a quantum secret sharing scheme to be constructed.
Since we have restricted ourselves to the pure-state schemes,
the family of forbidden sets must be AF = 2{1,...,n} \AQ. It is
also assumed that AQ satisfies the monotonicity condition
[5], that is, if A ∈ AQ and A ⊆ B ∈ 2{1,...,n} then B ∈ AQ.
The monotonicity condition of AQ implies the monotonic-
ity condition of AF in the reverse order, that is, if B ∈ AF
and B ⊇ A ∈ 2{1,...,n} then A ∈ AF .
We introduce some notations from [11]. Let ~y = (t,
x1, . . . , x2n−1). Later t becomes the design parameter of the
underlying threshold ramp quantum secret sharing scheme.
Specifically, the underlying ramp secret sharing allows re-
construction of the secret only from t or more shares. Let
b(p)i as the i-th bit of the binary representation of a positive
integer p. For a set A ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, define
1(A)p =
{
1 if there exists i ∈ A with b(p)i = 1,
0 otherwise.
Define 2n-dimensional vector a(ℓ, A) = (ℓ, 1(A)1, . . . ,
1(A)2n−1). Let hp be the number of 1’s in the binary repre-
sentation of a positive integer p, and ~h = (h0, h1, . . . , h2n−1).
As IPR2ρ˜ in [11], we solve the following integer optimization
problem:
minimize 〈~h, ~y〉,
subject to 〈a(−1, A), ~y〉 ≥ 0,∀A ∈ AQ,
〈−a(−1, A), ~y〉 ≥ L,∀A ∈ AF ,
~y ≥ 0,
where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner product of two vectors. Since
the above integer optimization problem is a relaxed version
of the original IPR2ρ˜ in [11], by Theorem 25 of [11] there
must be at least one solution ~y to our integer optimization
problem. By following [11], one can construct a classical
ramp secret sharing scheme with n participants, the quali-
fied set AQ, the forbidden set AF and the classical secret
consisting of L symbols in Fq. Since their construction pro-
duces a classical linear secret sharing scheme, it can be de-
scribed by a nested pair of linear codes C2 ⊂ C1 ⊂ Fmq ,
where m = x1 + · · · + x2n−1 determined by a solution ~y = (t,
x1, . . . , x2n−1) of the above integer optimization problem.
In the construction method [11], (t, L, m) classical ramp se-
cret sharing scheme is the underlying secret sharing scheme
used in construction of the desired secret sharing scheme.
Observe that the constructed classical ramp secret sharing
scheme has the minimum average share size, as proved in
[11]. Recall that in the constructed classical secret shar-
ing scheme expressed as C2 ⊂ C1, a participant receives
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some components of (z1, . . . , zm) ∈ C1 as his/her share. Let
Vi = { j | the i-th share contains z j} ⊂ {1, . . . , m}.
To avoid violation of the quantum no-cloning theorem,
we modify the coding theoretic expression C1/C2 and Vi.
Note that only expression is modified and the secret sharing
scheme itself is not modified. Let γ( j) = |{i | j ∈ Vi}|, and
m′ = γ(1) + · · · + γ(n). For ~z = (z1, . . . , zm) ∈ C1, define
φ(~z) = (z1, . . . , z1︸    ︷︷    ︸
γ(1) times
, . . . , zm, . . . , zm︸     ︷︷     ︸
γ(m) times
) ∈ Fm′q .
Let C′1 = φ(C1) and C′2 = φ(C2). Define V ′i ⊂ {1, . . . , m′}
such that {zℓ | ℓ ∈ Vi} = {φ(~z) j | j ∈ V ′i } and V ′i ∩ V ′i′ = ∅ for
i , i′, where ~z = (z1, . . . , zm) ∈ C1. By the disjointedness
V ′i ∩ V
′
i′ = ∅ we can avoid the violation of the quantum no-
cloning theorem. The above change of notations makes no
change in the actual operation of the constructed classical
secret sharing scheme. Then the same constructed secret
sharing scheme can also be described by the code pair C′2 ⊂
C′1. We also have |V
′
1| + |V
′
2| + · · · + |V
′
n| = m
′
.
We construct the ramp quantum secret sharing scheme
from C′2 ⊂ C
′
1 ⊂ F
m′
q in which the i-th participants receives
the j-th qudit among m′ qudits if and only if w j ∈ V ′i , where
(w1, . . . , wm′ ) ∈ C′1 and m′ qudits are defined from the quan-
tum secret as Eq. (3). Then the constructed quantum secret
sharing scheme has AQ as its qualified set, AF as its forbid-
den set, and L-qudit in its quantum share, and the average
share size is generally small.
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